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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the relationship between the extraction rates and remaining reserves of a
non-renewable resource.  Linear extraction rules are derived wherein the slope term is the
same regardless of the cost parameters and market structure whilst differences are captured by
the intercept.  Using data from the world oil industry the implied test could not be rejected for
the case of 1981 but failed using the 1991 and 2000 data.  Latterly, either OPEC members are
apparently extracting too slowly or non-OPEC countries are extracting too quickly.  Three
alternative resolutions of this puzzle are offered.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The ratios of extraction rates to estimated remaining reserves are widely reported for different
countries, and indeed on occasion are (mistakenly) used to extrapolate time until exhaustion.
Less attention is given to what might constitute the optimal relationship between extraction
and remaining reserves.  In this paper, a linear-quadratic optimal extraction problem is solved
for a variety of alternative market structures.  Such models yield reduced form solutions with
the control variable (extraction) linear in the state variable (reserves).
The theoretical work shows that regardless of the market structure, the relationship between
extraction and remaining reserves boils down to a simple representation.  At any point in
time, optimal extraction (qit) depends on a firm-specific constant (it) and the product of some
common slope parameter (t) and own remaining reserves (Rit) – a straightforward linear
function wherein differences in costs and market structure are all contained within the
intercept term, i.e.  it t it it R q     .  At any point in time, the slope parameter is the same
across all firms and extraction is independent of other firms’ remaining reserves.  Using
cross-sectional data to estimate the model suggests that the implied restriction can be rejected
for the case of 1981 but is rejected using data from 1991 and 2000.  In 1991 and 2000 at least,
the ratio of extraction to reported reserves is lower for OPEC members than for non-OPEC
countries.  The oil extraction puzzle is that in the later samples OPEC countries appear to be
extracting less rapidly than the theoretical work would predict.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the model foundations; section 3
formally derives the extraction paths within the context of a two-period model and section 4
derives solutions within the three-period context.  The model is estimated and tested in
section 5 and section 6 concludes.3
2.  MODEL FOUNDATIONS
Following Eswaran and Lewis (1985) and Hansen, Epple and Roberds (1985) and Hartwick
and Sadorsky (1990) two firms, which can be thought of as OPEC and non-OPEC groups of
countries extract from a fixed resource base over two, and later three periods.  The framework
is rich enough to permit analysis of competitive, monopolistic, and various intermediate
market structures.  The theoretical work confirms findings of the existing literature; in
simulations prices start lowest (highest) and finish highest (lowest) under competition
(monopoly).  Intermediate market structures imply price and extraction paths somewhere
between the two extremes.  Simulations suggest that there is little difference in aggregate
extraction (and therefore price) between the competitive and Stackelberg leadership cases,
although the composition of output differs markedly.  Analysis of the three-period case
confirms the result of Eswaran and Lewis (1985) that within the linear-quadratic model, the
Stackelberg leader model is dynamically consistent.
The model is based on that of Hansen, Epple and Roberds (1985), having removed the
stochastic component of their specification.  In the first instance there are two suppliers of a
resource who allocate extraction over two time periods, t=0,1.  The problem is expressed as
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Where pt is the resource price at time t, qit is extraction by firm i at time t, r is the interest rate,
and Ri are firm-i’s initial reserves and are taken as given.  Extraction costs are quadratic, and
depend on a firm specific parameter, i.  Quadratic costs may be justified as a reasonable
approximation to a wide class of cost functions.  Extraction costs are presupposed to be low
enough so as to make the reserve constraint, Ri = qi0 + qi1 bind.  Maximization is also subject
to a conventional inverse linear demand function,
 t t t q q b a p 2 1      (2)4
where a and b are positive parameters.
The method by which the firms attempt to maximize net present value depends on how they
view their own and their competitor’s ability to manipulate the price.  Hansen, Epple and
Roberds analyze three ‘symmetric’, and three ‘non-symmetric’ games.  The symmetric games
are as follows:
A.  Competitive Equilibrium: Each supplier maximizes its respective objective function
treating prices as exogenous.
B.  Symmetric Nash Game: Each supplier maximizes its respective objective function taking
into account its own influence on prices but treating the decisions of the other supplier as
exogenous.
C.  Collusive Game: The two suppliers collude and maximize the sum of the two objective
functions, taking into account their influence on prices.
The non-symmetric games all imply that in some sense firm 2 (i.e. OPEC or its core) is a
leader.  These games are characterized as
D.  Nash-Competitive (Myopic Leader) Game: The second player maximizes its objective
function, taking into account its influence on prices but treating the decisions of the first
player as exogenous.
E.  Dominant-Competitive (Stackelberg) Game: The second supplier maximizes its objective
function taking into account its influence both on prices and on the decisions of the first
player.
Hansen, Epple and Roberds also analyze a variant of game E that they call the time consistent
dominant-competitive game.  However, Eswaran and Lewis (1985) demonstrate that within a
linear-quadratic framework without uncertainty the open-loop solution to game E is
dynamically consistent
1.  Our analysis is therefore restricted to the five cases.
                                                          
1 In the two-period case, a commitment to extraction in period one entails an irreversible commitment
to extraction in the second period, given sufficiently low extraction costs.  Dynamic consistency of the
open-loop solution to game E in the three-period case is also proven below.5
3.  THE TWO-PERIOD MODEL
For the symmetric games, and indeed game D, Hansen, Epple and Roberds reformulate the
maximization problem of (1) as a problem faced by a social planner.  In these cases the social
planner maximizes
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2 2 c Ω , implying that both
firms equate marginal cost to marginal revenue.  Hence, maximization of (3) in the
competitive case requires that
       0 20 2 10 1 0 20 10 i i i i i q R q R q R b a q q q b a                (4)
for i=1,2.  The present value of the difference between price and marginal cost is constant,
which is the familiar condition under competition.  On the other hand, maximization under
monopoly requires that
       0 20 2 10 1 0 20 10 2 2 i i i i i q R q R q R b a q q q b a              ,  ( 5 )
and in this case, the present value of the difference between marginal revenue and marginal
costs is constant across time.











2 b Ω .  This structure is discussed in Sargent (1979); both players regard the others
output as given and beyond its own influence.  Firms do however consider the effect upon
price of changing their own output.  The first order conditions in this case are that6
            0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 i i i j j i i i i j i q R q R q R b a q q q b a              ,  ( 6 )
for i, j = 1, 2; i  j.  Both firms take the other’s output as given, and therefore set the present
value of the difference between marginal revenue and marginal costs to be equal across time.
The simplest non-symmetric game structure is that of the Nash-competitive game (game D).
Player 2 behaves as in game B and (myopically) takes player 1’s output as given, but player 1










Ω  and the first
order conditions now require that
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For firm one the present value of the difference between price and marginal cost is constant,
and for firm 2, the present value of the difference between marginal revenue minus marginal
cost is constant (and again, taking firm 1 output as given).
In each of the first four cases there are two equations, and two unknowns – first period
extraction of both firms.  For example rearranging (4) for qi0 gives two equations,
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for i = 1,2; j=1,2; i  j.
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for both firms.  The same procedure in the other three market structures yield the extraction
rules detailed in table 1.7
The dominant-firm (Stackelberg) game (E) requires a different solution method, because
player two now takes into account the effect that her actions have on price and the output
decision of the follower, player 1.  In game E, player 1, the (competitive) follower, reacts to
player 2, the (price fixing) leader.  The follower thus adheres to the condition in (4) and the
reaction function that this implies is therefore given by equation (8) where i = 1.  However,
the difference here is that the leader (firm 2) knows that the follower will adhere to this rule.
Given this, then the leader incorporates the followers reaction function directly into her own
objective function, and then optimizes, choosing her own and implicitly the followers’
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subject to the demand function, the reserve constraint and the reaction function of the
follower  
*
1t q .  This enables a rule for leader-extraction in the first period, and consequently
an equation for follower extraction.  These equations are also reported in table 1.8
Table 1 First period extraction rules under different market structures in the 2-period
model
Game structure Extraction Rules
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Table 1 shows that in all cases first period extraction (and therefore second period extraction)
depends upon the parameters of the demand function, the costs parameters of both firms, the
interest rate and own initial reserve stocks.  In all cases firm i’s first period-extraction is
independent of firm j’s remaining reserves.  This is not to say that firm i’s extraction plan is
independent of the extraction path of firm j; the intercept term varies according to the rule by
which firm j is operating.  The key result is that the ‘slope’ coefficient, by which today’s (first
period) extraction is related to own reserves initially remaining is equal to 1/(2+r) across all
industries.  The distinctions between the extraction profiles in the different industrial
structures are contained entirely in the intercept terms.9
Aggregate extraction, and therefore prices depend on the structure of the industry.  In this
formulation we are able to give a complete description of the extraction profile.  It is of
interest to compare extraction profiles in different industrial structures.  In proposition one the
relative sizes of aggregate extraction in the first period across the different industrial
structures are summarized.
Proposition 1: Denoting Q0G for aggregate first period extraction with game structure G = A,
B, C, D, E then Q0A > Q0E > Q0D > Q0B > Q0C.  The proof of this statement is straightforward
and contained in the appendix.
The composition of output depends on the specific parameterization.  As a base case of the
model, the demand specification is posited as pt = 50 – 0.023(q1t+q2t).  This ensures that
marginal revenue is positive over the relevant extraction range and that interior solutions are
obtained for all market structures.  The extraction cost parameter is the same for both firms;
1 = 2 = 0.006, ensuring that marginal cost does not exceed marginal revenue for output
ranges relevant to the example.  The interest rate is set at 50% (imagine the two periods
correspond to ten yearly intervals).  Initial reserves, R1 and R2 are set at 500 and 1500 to
reflect an advantageous leader resource endowment.  The results of the base case are
presented in table 2.
Table 2 Extraction profiles, prices and profits in the 2-period model base case
Game Structure p0 p1 q01 q11 1 q02 q12 2
Competitive 22.8 31.2 392.3 107.7 10685 792.3 707.7 29885
Symmetric
Nash
25.5 28.5 333.3 166.7 11270 733.3 766.7 30470
Monopoly 26.9 27.1 302.0 198.0 11350 702.0 798.0 30550
Nash
Competitive
23.4 30.6 496.2 3.8 10939 661.3 838.7 29863
Stackelberg 23.0 31.0 439.1 60.9 10786 733.3 766.7 2993010
Table 2 demonstrates the result that prices start lowest, and finish highest under competition.
Conversely prices start highest and finish lowest under monopoly.  Profits (i) are highest for
both firms under monopoly, but the full cooperation implied by monopoly is unlikely to be
stable given the incentives to increase first period extraction unilaterally.  When firm 1 acts
competitively and firm 2 engages in price manipulation but ignores the effects of its output
upon firm 2’s output (market structure D) firm 1 benefits from firm 2’s output reduction.
However, because of the fact that firm 2 ignores its own impact upon firm 1’s extraction
decision firm 2 is actually worse off than even the competitive case.  When firm 2 acts as a
Stackelberg leader (thereby recognizing the impact of its own extraction pattern upon the
smaller firm) initial output is increased somewhat and firm 2 profits are higher relative to case
D.  The price path in the Stackelberg case is relatively unchanged from the competitive
solution, although both firms benefit somewhat from this price-leadership.
It is unlikely that both firms will have the same value of the cost function parameter.  Given
that firm 2 extracts a larger amount in each period due to its larger reserves, then the same
cost parameter implies that marginal costs are higher for firm 2 than for firm 1, which is
somewhat incongruous.  To examine the more realistic case, where marginal costs of firm 2
are less than those for firm 1 the base case is amended, setting 2 = 0.00003 – this value
implies that marginal costs are approximately equal to £2 at an output level of 750.  The
results of this simulation are presented in table 3.
Table 3 Extraction profiles, prices and profits, 2-period model, leader cost advantage
Game Structure p0 p1 q01 q11 1 q02 q12 2
Competitive 21.6 32.4 202.2 297.8 10500 1032.1 467.9 32391
Symmetric
Nash
25.2 28.8 323.5 176.5 11161 755.5 744.5 33314
Monopoly 26.6 27.4 201.1 298.9 10509 816.2 683.8 34188
Nash
Competitive
23.3 30.7 485.8 14.2 10908 674.5 825.6 32599
Stackelberg 22.6 31.4 373.0 127.0 10650 816.7 683.3 3276011
When firm 2 has a cost advantage as well as greater initial reserves, table 3 shows that the
price path and therefore the aggregate extraction path is similar to the base case.  However,
the composition of output in each period is changed quite markedly depending on the market
structure.  Firm 1 first period extraction is reduced in all cases, as would be expected given
firm 2’s new cost advantage.  This reduction is most dramatic in the competitive instance, and
relatively small in the two non-symmetric market structures.
These results imply that there is relatively little difference in aggregate output between the
competitive and Stackelberg outcomes, even when the leader has a considerable cost
advantage and is in possession of 75% of global reserves.  The difference in first-period
aggregate output under these two market structures is given by
      2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
3
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ar b
; hence the output difference depends on
all the model parameters.  Nonetheless for all plausible parameterizations this difference is
relatively quite small.
The two-period model enables an examination of the price and output paths under different
market structures.  Optimal extraction plans do not depend on other firms’ reserve stocks, and
furthermore the direct relationship between extraction and own reserves is remarkably simple.
We now turn to the three period case to see if this result holds, and furthermore to examine
the possibility of dynamic inconsistency.
4.  THE THREE-PERIOD MODEL
Analysis of a three-period model enables us to test the robustness of the two-period results.  It
also enables examination of the problem of dynamic inconsistency.  Recall that in the two
period model there is no problem of pre-commitment, because the leader is constrained to
exhaust in period 2 and there is clearly no benefit from changing that plan once period 212
arrives.  However, in the three-period context, there may exist incentives to the leader to
change the extraction plan once the first period is over.  Newbery (1981) discusses such a
context where fringe costs are lower than monopoly costs; having ‘encouraged’ the fringe to
extract rapidly, the leader may be able to hike the price given the absence of any competitive
constraints.  The approach used here enables a fuller analysis of this issue as the extraction
paths are explicitly derived.
The solution method
2 is as before, under the maintained assumptions of the model there are
two first order conditions applying to both firms.  For example in the competitive case,
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Solution of these four equations yields four unknowns (q10, q11, q20 and q21).  The extraction
profiles are presented in table 4.  In the case of the Stackelberg equilibrium, the leader takes
the competitive responses in periods 0 and 1 (and therefore implicitly the final period) as
given and optimizes by choosing period 0 and 1 extraction rates.  This is an open-loop
equilibrium, and therefore potentially dynamically inconsistent.
Table 4 confirms some of the results of the two-period optimal extraction plans.  Once again,
the slope coefficient is equal across firms regardless of whether or how the firm is price
setting and the cost structure.  Extraction profiles are also independent of competitors’
remaining reserves.  The extraction profiles in the base case
3 and the leader cost-advantage
case are presented in tables 5 and 6.
                                                          
2 The derivations are appended and are available as a Maple 6 file.
3 Initial reserves are respectively set equal to 1000 and 2000, and the discount rate set equal to 0.3 so as
to ensure an internal solution.  These modifications do not alter the substance of the analysis.13
Table 4 Extraction rules under different market structures in the 3-period model
Game structure Extraction Rules
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Once again prices starts off lowest (highest) and finish highest (lowest) in the competitive
(monopoly) case.  The intermediate market structures lead to price paths that concur with the
above discussion.  As before there is relatively very little to choose between the competitive
and Stackelberg outcomes, although once again the composition of aggregate output is altered
significantly in these two cases.
Table 5 Extraction profiles, prices and profits in the 3-period model base case
Game
Structure
p0 p1 p2 q10 q11 q12 1 q20 q21 q22 2
A 21.7 26.5 32.8 489.2 347.5 163.3 19841 739.8 673.3 586.9 37886
B 25.1 26.8 29.1 416.0 340.9 243.1 20766 666.7 666.7 666.7 38811
C 26.9 27.0 27.1 377.2 337.3 285.5 20892 627.8 663.1 709.0 38937
D 22.5 26.6 31.9 618.1 359.2 22.7 20242 577.3 658.5 764.2 37851
E 22.1 26.6 32.4 547.2 352.8 100.0 20000 666.7 666.7 666.7 37957
Table 6 Extraction profiles, prices and profits, 3-period model, leader cost advantage
Game
Structure
p0 p1 p2 q10 q11 q12 1 q20 q21 Q22 2
A 20.3 26.4 34.3 253.3 326.1 420.6 19549 1037 700.4 262.4 40594
B 24.7 26.8 29.5 403.9 339.7 256.4 20593 694.2 669.2 636.6 42052
C 26.5 27.0 27.5 252 325.9 422.1 19563 769.4 676 554.6 43432
D 22.4 26.6 32.0 605.2 358.1 36.8 20194 593.6 660 746.4 40922
E 21.6 26.5 32.9 465.2 345.3 189.5 19785 770.1 676.1 553.8 41177
We now turn our attention to the question of whether or not the Stackelberg equilibrium is
dynamically consistent.
Proposition 2: The Stackelberg equilibrium is dynamically consistent.  In particular optimal
extraction in the second period detailed at the outset of the three period case is the same as
optimal extraction were the leader to re-optimize at the start of the second period.
Proposition 2 is a special case of Proposition 1 of Eswaran and Lewis (1985).  In order to
prove proposition 2, it is required that equation (12E22) is equal to equation (11E2) above,15
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which is equation (13E22).
5.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The above theory has a surprisingly strong implication.  Very simply, we just have
it Ft Ft it R q     (14)
it Ct Ct it R q     (15)
where Ft and Ct respectively denote the (time-varying) fringe and cartel intercept term and
Ft and Ct, are respectively the (again time varying) fringe and cartel slope term.  The above
theory suggests that Ft = Ct regardless of the market and/or the cost structure.  If the market
operates under competitive conditions, and the two sets of agents have identical cost
parameters then we would also expect to find Ct = Ft
4.  If the market operates under
competitive conditions and the cartel has a cost advantage over the fringe then we would
expect to find Ct > Ft.  If OPEC (or some subset) attempts to fix prices along the lines of the16
Stackelberg model and/or there is a cost differential between the two sets of firms then in
general there is a discrepancy between the intercept terms.  If the cost advantage were
sufficiently small then we would expect to find Ct < Ft.  From equations  (12E11) and
(12E12) this requires 
1
2 1 2 1
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is no reason why this or the converse might hold.  The cartel intercept may thus be above or
below the fringe intercept.  Overall, we can use the theoretical framework to specify the
following empirical model:
t t it t t it OPEC R q       (16)
where OPECt is a dummy variable set equal to one if the country is a member of OPEC.
The data employed in this section comes from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy,
2001.  This provides data on ‘proved reserves’ as of the end of 1980, 1990 and 1999, and
average daily extraction rates
5 for every major oil extracting country in the world.  The
approach taken here is a cross section analysis for each of these three time periods due to the
time varying nature of the parameters.  The full sample of countries is divided into the OPEC
members
6 and the ‘competitive fringe’.  Unrestricted estimation
7 of (14) and (15) over the
relevant sub-samples and estimation of the restricted model (16) over the full data set yielded
the results in table 7.
                                                                                                                                                                     
4 Eswaran and Lewis (1985) consider this case.
5 Multiplied by 365 to give a figure for annual extraction rates, in particular for data for 1981, 1991 and
2000.
6 Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and the United
Arab Emirates.
7 For the 1981 observation Iran and Iraq are omitted from the sample and in the 1991 case Iraq and
Kuwait are omitted.17
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8 Estimation by ordinary least squares, t-ratios are reported in parentheses.
9 The sample size.
10 The ‘R-bar’ statistic for overall goodness of fit.
11 A Breusch-Pagan (1979) test for heteroskedasticity.  Under the null of homoskedasticity the statistic
NR
2 from the regression  1 ,
2
   i i R     follows a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom.
The significance level is reported in {}.
12 The F test of the model restriction, with one degree of freedom in the numerator and n degrees of
freedom in the denominator where n is the number of degrees of freedom relating to the unrestricted
regressions.18
Each regression exhibits a reasonable amount of explanatory power, and the estimated
coefficients exhibit the signs as expected in all cases.  However, there is consistent evidence
that the slope coefficient differs substantially between OPEC and the competitive producers,
contrary to the theory outlined above.  This is corroborated by an F-test of the restriction
implied in equation (16).  The F statistic in all three cases leads to rejection at the 1% level of
the null hypothesis of common slopes.  Furthermore the Breusch-Pagan test indicates
considerable heteroskedasticity within the fringe which could reflect parameter heterogeneity
within the fringe sample.
Examination of the residuals reveals that the USA is an extreme outlier in all cases.  In
particular, extraction rates are in excess of the regression-predicted amount by over three
standard errors in every case
13.  Omission of the USA
14 improved estimation in the following
way: The slope coefficient for the 1981 and 1991 fringe samples was noticeably reduced in
size, but increased in significance.  Furthermore, the F-statistic implied by the model
restriction becomes insignificantly different from zero for the 1981 sample, although in this
sample there is persistent evidence of heteroskedasticity.  The model restriction was again
firmly rejected in the other two samples.
In order to deal with the heteroskedasticity the weighted least squares procedure described by
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, p.130) is employed.  This method presupposes that the source
of the heteroskedasticity is that implied by the Breusch-Pagan test (i.e. the errors are
correlated with remaining reserves – see footnote 11).  Estimation, omitting the US and
correcting for heteroskedasticity yielded the results in table 8.
                                                          
13  We do not conjecture why the US chooses to ‘over-extract’ in this way.
14 The full results are available on request.19
Table 8 WLS estimation results, omitting the USA and correcting for heteroskedasticity
Parameter (t-stat) Sample
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Application of weighted least squares (WLS) eliminates the previously identified
heteroskedasticity.  The estimated coefficients maintain their signs and significance, although
overall explanatory power is reduced following omission of the USA.  Similarly, the OPEC
dummy variable remains insignificant although given that the cartel intercept might be lower
or higher depending on the cost parameters and the demand function slope this is not
necessarily a criticism of the model in itself.  Recall that if the market were characterized by
competition and the cartel had a large enough cost advantage, then we would expect to find
that the OPEC parameter might be positive.  Given that it is widely acknowledged that such a
cost advantage does exist for OPEC members, then the absence of a positive parameter might
indicate that OPEC has been attempting to exercise market power, perhaps along the lines of
the Stackelberg model, especially in the early 1980s.
Following the correction for heteroskedasticity the model restriction test is passed in the
earliest period (1981), but fails (at the 5% level) in the later two samples.  It therefore remains
to explain why OPEC members seem to be extracting too slowly, or indeed non-OPEC20
countries too quickly.  There are three possible solutions to this puzzle – mis-specification,
misbehavior or mis-measurement.
The model may be mis-specified.  For example, remaining reserves might play a more
complex role in the extraction decision process than that implied by the model developed here
and elsewhere in the literature.  The model parameters contained in the intercept term might
themselves depend on remaining reserves.  Even in the original work by Hotelling (1931) it is
conjectured that costs might increase as cumulative extraction of a fixed resource base (and
therefore as remaining reserves decline).  Were the  parameters to directly depend on the
level of remaining reserves, then the model would have to be reformulated to account directly
for this.  Nonetheless, the quadratic specification may be a reasonable approximation to wider
classes of cost functions.  More critically, were the model badly mis-specified then one might
expect the model restriction to be rejected for all three periods and not just the last two.
Secondly, agents may be acting sub-optimally.  This is the least favored explanation for the
conventional reasons.  Why would non-OPEC countries choose to over-extract, or why would
OPEC members under-extract?  Again, why would this sub-optimal behavior emerge at some
point following 1981?
Finally, mis-measurement may explain the results.  Either the fringe possesses more reserves
than they are saying, or OPEC members’ true reserves are less than declared.  It is unclear
why the fringe might systematically understate its own remaining reserves.  Laherrere (2001)
focuses on the latter possibility, arguing that reported remaining reserves depend upon the
image that the author wishes to give (Laherrere, 2001, p9).  The award of quota within OPEC,
and intra-cartel bargaining strength may thus depend on declared remaining reserves.
(Indeed, reported total OPEC reserves increased by 80% over the 1980s as opposed to fringe
reserve increases of 10%).  Furthermore, if such an overstatement of remaining reserves21
explains the oil extraction puzzle, then table 8 suggests that the degree of overstatement has
increased from 1981 through 1991 to 2001.
6.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyses a duopoly model of non-renewable resource extraction.  Optimal
extraction plans are derived within two and three period models for five alternative market
structures subject to the constraint of market demand, a resource constraint and quadratic
extraction technology.  An important finding is that regardless of the market structure, the
relationship between extraction and remaining reserves boils down to a surprisingly simple
representation – a straightforward linear function wherein differences in costs and market
structure are all contained within the intercept term.
The theoretical work lends itself to straightforward econometric estimation.  The key
restriction implied by the model is that the slope term of the linear extraction relationship is
the same regardless of the cost parameters and market structure.  Applying cross-sectional
data to the model suggested that the simple linear relationship could not be rejected for the
case of 1981 but failed using the 1991 and 2000 data.  This puzzle is explained either by
model mis-specification, sub-optimal extraction, or (increasing) overstatement of reserves by
OPEC members.22
APPENDIX  Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of proposition 1 requires proof of four statements:
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Proposition 1 therefore must hold given 1, 2, b > 0.24
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